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INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND
HOMELAND SECURITY: COORDINATION
AND COLLABORATION IN

NORTH AMERICA
Christopher Rudolph*

"There is probably no more important policy in preventing attacks
on American soil than the nation's immigration system... [blecause
the current terrorist threat comes almost exclusively from terrorists
who arrive from abroad."1
-Steven Camarota, Center for Immigration Studies
"In many
ways, the age of unilateralism in border controls may be
2
over."
-Demetrios G. Papademetriou, Migration Policy Institute
I.

MIGRATION AND HOMELAND SECURITY:
THE "NEW" THREAT

HE events of September 11, 2001, reintroduced a term to the
American lexicon not widely heard since the "red scare" of 1950s
McCarthyism: homeland security. Moreover, the fact that the 9/11
terrorists manipulated U.S. immigration laws in order to infiltrate the
country and to carry out their attack on U.S. soil made the link between
global terrorism and international migration explicitly clear. 3 In terms of
the migration-terrorism link, the key questions facing policy makers were,
"How did we get so vulnerable?" and "What can we do to protect ourselves from global terrorism?"
Increasingly, policy makers, pundits, and the general public recognize
that migration is an international phenomenon, one that both facilitates
Professor of International Politics, School of International Service,
American University, Washington, DC. crudolph@american.edu.
1. Steven A. Camarota, "The Open Door: How Militant Islamic Terrorists Entered
and Remained in the United States, 1993-2001," Center Paper 21 (Washington,
*Assistant

DC: Center for Immigration Studies, 2003), p. 13, available at http://www.cis.org/
articles/2002/theopendoor.pdf.
2. Demetrios G. Papademetriou, "A Grand Bargain: Balancing National Security,
Economic, and Immigration Interests of the U.S. and Mexico." Policy paper. Migration Policy Institute (April 2002), p. 7.
3. Camarota.
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processes of globalization and interdependence and is affected by them. 4
Although immigration and border control have long been central to our
notions of sovereignty, 5 dynamics of contemporary international migration suggest that it is difficult, if not impossible, to achieve complete control over flows unilaterally. 6 Prior to 9/11, scholarly discussions regarding
the need for a multilateral regime focused on addressing the need to facilitate flows for economic need, and/or reducing illegal immigration. 7 Although dialogue regarding migration regimes has been most rigorous in
the European Union, strong interests exist among North American countries to craft policy in the EU mold. For the United States and Canada,
the information technology revolution created significant demand for
highly skilled labor, and certain sectors of the economy have shown a
"structural embeddedness" of demand for unskilled foreign labor as
well. 8 For Mexico (and other developing countries like it), emigration
not only offers a safety valve for unemployment pressures, but also represents a significant source of needed foreign exchange-some $14 billion

4. See Christopher Rudolph, "Globalization and Security: Migration and Evolving
Conceptions of Security in Statecraft and Scholarship," Security Studies 13:1 (Fall
2004); Douglas S. Massey et al., Worlds in Motion (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1998); James Mittelman, The Globalization Syndrome (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Saskia Sassen, "Beyond Sovereignty: De-Facto Transnationalism in Immigration Policy," paper read at the annual meeting of the American
Political Science Association, Atlanta, GA (Sept. 1-5, 1999).
5. Christopher Rudolph, "Sovereignty and Territorial Borders in a Global Age," InternationalStudies Review 7:1 (2005), pp. 1-20; John Torpey, "States and the Regulation of Migration in the Twentieth-Century North Atlantic World," in The Wall
Around the West, eds. P. Andreas and T. Snyder (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000); Cheryl Shanks, Immigration and the Politics of American Sovereignty, 1890-1990 (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2001); Aristide
R. Zolberg, "Changing Sovereignty Games and International Migration," Indiana
Journalof Global Legal Studies 2:1 (1994).
6. Wayne A. Cornelius, Takeyuki Tsuda, Philip L. Martin, and James F. Hollifield,
eds., ControllingImmigration: A Global Perspective (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994).
7. Much of the argument centered on replacing increasingly unwanted illegal immigration by facilitating more legal migration. Cf Bimal Ghosh, ed., Managing Migration: Time for a New InternationalRegime? (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2000); James F. Hollifield, "Migration, Trade, and the Nation-State: The Myth of
Globalization," in ReconsideringImmigration in an Integrating World, ed. Christopher Rudolph, UCLA Journal of Int'l Law & Foreign Affairs 3:2 (1998), special
issue; Kathleen Newland and Demetrios G. Papademetriou, "Managing International Migration: Tracking the Emergence of a New International Regime," in Reconsidering Immigration in an Integrating World, ed. Christopher Rudolph, UCLA
Journalof Int'l Law & ForeignAffairs 3:2 (1998), special issue; Howard F. Chang,
"Migration as International Trade: The Economic Benefits from the Liberalized
Movement of Labor," in Reconsidering Immigration in an Integrating World, ed.
Christopher Rudolph, UCLA Journal of Int'l Law & Foreign Affairs 3:2 (1998),
special issue.
8. Wayne A. Cornelius, Thomas J. Espenshade, and Idean Salehyan, eds., The International Migration of the Highly Skilled (La Jolla, CA: Center for Comparative
Immigration Studies, 2001); Wayne A. Cornelius, The Role of Immigrant Labor in
the U.S. and Japanese Economies (La Jolla, CA: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies,
1998).
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annually. 9
With the emergence of the homeland security linkage and the threat of
global terrorism, discourse regarding the need for cooperation and coordination has again sustained momentum. 10 Given the clear tension between strong economic interests for policy openness and strong security
interests favoring closure, we have seen policy makers increasingly argue
that the only solution is to craft "smart borders": those that have an unprecedented ability to filter out terrorists, criminals, and other undesirables while enabling cross border flows to remain relatively
unhindered. Former U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security, Tom Ridge,
made this point clear: "We're working with Canada and Mexico to institute smart borders that will keep terrorists out, while letting the flow of
commerce in." 11
Given the traditional view of immigration and border patrol as the sole
prerogative of domestic public policy, such pronouncements represent
not only a radical departure from traditional views about immigration,
but also on the nature of sovereignty and the role of borders in international society. Significant advances in information technology certainly
provide us with the tools necessary to facilitate a "smarter" border,1 2 but
having an increased ability to cooperate does not necessarily mean that
states will cooperate. In this paper, I seek to address two primary questions: 1) Where is cooperation and/or coordination likely, and what challenges do we face in facilitating such endeavors, and 2) What are the
prospects for a regional migration control regime-a north American security perimeter?
II.

REGIME FORMATION

In a world increasingly marked by both globalization and complex interdependence, states find their options strongly shaped by the interest
calculus and decisions by other states.1 3 Indeed, much of the recent discourse concerning both international migration and global terrorism
highlight the fact that these forces are shaped by myriad forces in world
politics, making them seemingly applicable to issues of regime formation
9. Philip L. Martin, "Trade, Aid, and Migration," InternationalMigrationReview 26:1
(1992); Sharon Stanton Russell, "Migrant Remittances and Development," International Migration 30:3-4 (1992); Peter Gammeltoft, "Remittances and Other Financial Flows to Developing Countries," CDR Working Paper 02.11 (Copenhagen:
Centre for Development Research, August 2002).
10. Cf Papademetriou; Deborah Meyers, "Security at U.S. Borders: A Move Away
from Unilateralism?" Migration Information Source (August 2003); Deborah Waller Meyers, "Does Smarter Lead to Safer? An Assessment of the Border Accords
with Canada and Mexico, Insight (June 2003).
11. Remarks to the U.S. Conference of Mayors, Washington, D.C., Jan. 23, 2002, cited
in Meyers, "Does Smarter Lead to Safer?,", p. 1.
12. Rey Koslowski, "Information Technology, Migration and Border Control," paper
read at the Institute for Governmental Studies, University of California, Berkeley,
Apr. 25, 2002.
13. Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977).
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in order to better control outcomes. What factors determine whether or
not a regime-such as a North American security perimeter-is created,
and what determines the form it will take? I draw on regime theory from
the international relations literature to provide a theoretical framework
for my analysis. There are three primary schools of thought concerning
regime formation: realism, neoliberal institutionalism, and cognitivism
4
(i.e., constructivism).1
For realists, "the distribution of capabilities among actors critically affects both the prospects for effective regimes to emerge and persist in an
issue area and the nature of the regimes that result .... -15 In other
words, power is the essential explanatory variable, and regimes are established only when they reflect the self-interest of the most powerful
states. 16 In the North American context, this would then place the
United States and its perception of national interest as the driving force
of regime formation. Within the realist paradigm, any North American
security regime would necessarily be based on American interests and
how political suasion may subsequently affect the interest calculus of its
neighbors to the north and south. Rather than being the product of common interests or a multilaterally negotiated settlement, realists would
predict that a North American perimeter would be characterized as an
"imposed regime."1 7 Moreover, in terms of duration of such a regime,
realists would expect it to function in its original form only so long as it
reflects the interests of the dominant state in the constellation of power at
the point of implementation. In other words, the regime will exist only so
long as it conforms to American self-interest.
Where power is the primary variable forwarded by realists, neoliberal
institutionalists argue that it is in fact the constellation of interests rather
than the constellation of power that is essential in understanding regime
formation. 18 Arthur Stein suggests that international regimes are created
14. Cf Stephen Krasner, ed., Regime Theory (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1983); Stephan Haggard and Beth Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes,"
International Organization 41:3 (1987); Andres Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and
Volker Rittberger, eds., Theories of InternationalRegimes (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1997); Andres Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger,
"Integrating Theories of International Regimes," Review of International Studies
26:1 (2002), pp. 3-33.

15. Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, "Integrating Theories of International Regimes," p. 9.
16. Cf Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-

versity Press, 1981); Stephen D. Krasner, "Global Communications and National
Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier," World Politics 43 (1991); Joseph M. Grieco,

Cooperation Among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade

(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990).
17. See Oran R. Young, "Regime Dynamics: The Rise and Fall of International Regimes," in International Regimes, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1983), pp. 93-113.
18. Cf Robert 0. Keohane, "The Demand for International Regimes," in International Regimes, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1983), pp. 141-171; Arthur A. Stein, "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in
an Anarchic World," in International Regimes, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 115-140; Robert Axelrod and Robert 0.
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to manage dilemmas of common interests and common aversions in an
anarchic world. 19 Dilemmas of common interests arise when unconstrained individual decision-making among actors (states) would result in
Pareto-deficient outcomes. Attainment of the common good is dependent on interstate collaboration that protects against the likelihood that
one state defects from its commitments. To remedy this, regimes are established that constrain individual decision making in order to achieve
the desired Pareto-optimal outcome.
In contrast, dilemmas of common aversions arise not from a common
desire for a specific outcome, but a common aversion to one possibility.
Such dilemmas do not require ceding such a high degree of sovereignty in
the creation of a regime, since they are not intended to produce a specific
outcome-simply to avoid an undesirable one. Such regimes also generally do not require such a high degree of formalization as those necessary
in dealing with dilemmas of common interest. As such, Stein suggests
that these would generally not be described as a formal regime.
To utilize such a framework within the context of a North American
security perimeter requires that we identify the constellation of interests
among participants. Is the issue of migration and security one of common
interests or common aversions? The answer to this lies in the perceptions
of representative policy makers involved and requires close scrutiny of
policy makers' statements in how they frame the issue of a security perimeter and what they define as the preferred objective. If each sees the
identification and apprehension of terrorists as the primary objective, we
may have a dilemma of common interest and could anticipate movement
toward a formal regime wherein participants would necessarily cede some
independent policy making sovereignty. On the other hand, if participants simply seek to avoid another major terrorist event in North
America, they may not necessarily have the same desired policy outcome.
Instead, they simply want to avoid one possible (undesirable) outcome.
If this is the case, we could anticipate that movement toward some kind
of regional regime would be less formal and would not be characterized
by moves to surrender high levels of independent sovereignty over policy
nor would we likely see deep harmonization of policy (i.e., common immigration and refugee policies among NAFTA countries).
Clearly, the distinction between realism and neoliberal institutionalism
is a fine one, for it often seems that their similarities outweigh their differences. Emphasis on the role of state power and interests in an anarchic system underlie both. Indeed, Adreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer,
and Volker Rittberger have argued that little stands in the way of a synthesized approach incorporating both realism and neoliberal institutionalism. They write, "Neoliberalism and realism not only share a
Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," in
Cooperation Under Anarchy, ed. Kenneth A. Oye (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).
19. Stein, pp. 115-140.
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commitment to rationalismas a metatheoretical stance, but may fruitfully
work together when it comes to explaining international regimes, thus
offering the prospect of a more unified rationalist theory of international
institutions. ' 20 They are less optimistic about integration of constructivist
approaches.
Constructivists stress the role of social knowledge in the practice of
world politics. 2 1 Where norms, ideas, and principles are seen as largely
epiphenomenal to policy outcomes (such as regime formation) in both
the realist and neoliberal camps, they are considered much more endogenous from the constructivist perspective. Constructivists not only suggest
that structural environments are largely a social construct, 22 but also that
social constructs (such as identities) shape interests. 23 In other words,
"We have to know who we are before we can know what our interests
are."' 24 How might this point of view help us to understand the dynamics
of regime formation? There are several possibilities for the role of
norms, ideas, and principles. The first involves perceptions regarding the
interests and motives of other participants. Robert Jervis argues that in
order for regimes to develop, participants must believe that others share
their interests in regime design and targeted results. 25 This perspective
clearly suggests overlap with neoliberal perspectives concerning the constellation of interests as primary causal variables. On the one hand, it
appears supportive of Stein's view that shared interests are pivotal in regime formation. However, when mixed with the realist perspective, it
raises the question of interests in situations of "imposed regimes." Can
imposed regimes establish conditions of common interest? In other
words, if one nation has a preponderance of power, could economic and/
or security dependence cause interests to converge? As applied in the
North American context, such questions press for a more complete understanding of both individual interests (at the state level), as well as
whether American leadership and/or suasion truly create a political environment of common interest if individually they are not congruent.
Another key area where ideas would seem to matter in the North
American context is also closely linked to issues of power and interest.
20. Hasenclever, Mayer, & Rittberger, "Integrating Theories of International Regimes," p. 7.
21. Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory
and International Relations (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press,
1989); Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of InternationalPolitics (Cambridge: Cam-

bridge University Press, 1999).
22. Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of
Power Politics," International Organization 46 (1992), pp. 391-425.
23. Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State,"
American PoliticalScience Review 88 (1994), pp. 384-396; Mathias Albert, David
Jacobson, and Yosef Lapid, eds., Identities, Borders, Orders (Minneapolis, MN:
University of Minnesota Press, 2001); Wendt, Social Theory of International
Politics.
24. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Erosion of American National Interests," ForeignAffairs 76:5 (1997), pp. 28-29. Emphasis added.
25. Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes," in InternationalRegimes, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), pp. 173-194.
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Specifically, shared histories shape national identities in the context of
relationships between peoples and states. Current challenges facing
states in North America must be cast within a historical context-one
that involves social sensitivities to power differentials. The United States'
role as the regional hegemon creates expectations that weaker neighboring states should "fall in line" with U.S. interests. This attitude was
clearly articulated during Operation Iraqi Freedom, as U.S. policy makers
pressed Canadian and Mexican policy makers to pledge support for the
war effort. On the other side, Canadian and Mexican policy makers are
at times weary of being bullied by their stronger neighbor or are reluctant
to appear as a political lackey to U.S. interests. 26 Such power relationships have a strong effect on the national consciousness, engendering sentiments that a truly "sovereign" national identity requires at least
periodic dissent against American interests. These issues come to the
fore in cases where there is a disparity of interests and may significantly
complicate the formation of "imposed regimes."
Lastly, and perhaps most significantly, traditional ideas about sovereignty may also have an effect on a potential regime in North America,
particularly when applied to issues of migration and border control. Although neoclassical economic principles adopted in the contemporary
Bretton Woods era have prompted many "trading states" to willingly
cede some degree of sovereignty in terms of cross-border flows in order
to obtain the economic benefits of such mobility,27 this has generally not
been applied in the realm of international migration.28 Rather, control
over who enters the country and who may be eligible to become part of
the national polity remains a cornerstone of societal dimensions of sovereignty. 29 As such, efforts to shift policy making beyond the confines of
the nation-state have continually met strong resistance or have been unable to overcome initial political inertia whatsoever. This has been the
case even in Europe, where we have witnessed the most ambitious efforts
to establish such a supranational regime. 30 Complicating the issue in the
North American context is the disparity of views regarding migration and
sovereignty. Whereas Canadians and Americans generally see the exten26. See, for example, Luis Herrera-Lasso, "The Impact of U.S. Immigration Policy on
the U.S.-Mexico Relationship," in Reconsidering Immigration in an Integrating
World, ed. Christopher Rudolph, UCLA Journalof Int'l Law & ForeignAffairs 3:2
(1998), special issue, pp. 357-370.
27. Richard N. Rosecrance, Rise of the Trading State (New York: Basic Books, 1986).
28. Cornelius, Tsuda, Martin, and Hollifield, Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective; Christopher Rudolph, "Security and the Political Economy of International Migration," American PoliticalScience Review 97:4 (2003).
29. Rudolph, "Sovereignty and Territorial Borders in a Global Age," p. 1-20.
30. Kathleen Newland and Demetrios G. Papademetriou, "Managing International
Migration: Tracking the Emergence of a New International Regime," in Reconsidering Immigration in an Integrating World, ed. Christopher Rudolph, UCLA Journal of Int'l Law & Foreign Affairs 3:2 (1998), special issue; Demetrios G.
Papademetriou, Coming Together or Pulling Apart? The European Union's Struggle with Immigration and Asylum (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996).
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sion of control measures as an assertion of social/state sovereignty, Mexicans continually assert the right of individuals to migrate as a cornerstone
of sovereignty-both domestically and internationally-a right explicit in
the Mexican constitution.
I argue in this paper that the process of regime formation (or failure to
enact a formal regime) in terms of a North American perimeter will involve the interaction of power-based, interest-based, and idea-based variables rather than begin dominated by a single causal variable. Mexican
president Vicente Fox and his administration have often spoken of a desire for a comprehensive agreement on migration-indeed, Fox has re31
peatedly said that this was the cornerstone of Mexican foreign policy.
For Mexican policy makers the objective was not an incremental or piecemeal approach, but rather (in their words), "the whole enchilada." However, when examining the interaction of the three primary variables
identified here, my analysis suggests that such a "grand bargain" seems
rather unlikely. Instead, we are more likely to see any regime formation
take the form of bilateral rather than multilateral agreements, and these
agreements will likely produce increased coordination (shallow integration, retention of policy sovereignty) rather than collaboration (deeper
integration, harmonization of immigration and refugee policy).
III.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN NORTH AMERICA

Recognition of regional-if not global-interdependence concerning
international migration has pressed policy makers to shift political discourse from one solely rooted in a domestic perspective to one that
moves beyond national borders. This does not necessarily mean that policy makers see management issues from a regional interest, but rather,
that regional cooperation is necessary in order to achieve national interests. In an address to the Senate Judiciary Committee on March 4, 2003,
John Ashcroft explained that "close working relationships with international allies" would allow the United States to "leverage our anti-terrorism efforts throughout the world."'32 Ashcroft's remarks suggest that, for
American policy makers, international cooperation is seen as an extension of U.S. interests and strategy. This strategy to "leverage" U.S. efforts through international cooperation has initially taken two primary
forms: the "Smart Border Declaration" with Canada and the "U.S.-Mexico Border Partnership Action Plan."

31. Jorge Castafieda, "The Forgotten Relationship," Foreign Affairs 82:3 (2003), pp.
67-81.
32. John Ashcroft, "The War Against Terrorism: Working Together to Protect
America," Testimony presented before the Committee on the Judiciary, United
States Senate (Mar. 4, 2003), available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/
library/congress/2003_h/03-04-03_ashcroft.htm
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U.S.-CANADA SMART BORDER ACTION PLAN

Bilateral cooperation between the United States has a long tradition,
and has been described as "the most extensive bilateral relationship in
the world."'33 Tom Ridge, then-U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security, explained the desire for intergovernmental cooperation as an issue of common interests. He stated, "By working together we can better reach our
'34
common goals of ensuring the security and prosperity of our citizens."
Yet, when we examine the parameters of the existing bilateral measures
taken concerning migration and border control, it appears that "common
interests" have not generated movement toward a formal regime.
Rather, the extension of egoistic self-interest (i.e., "leveraging" domestic
efforts) is the driving force being the increased cooperation that we have
seen, especially since 9/11.
From the American viewpoint, cooperation with Canada is deemed increasingly important for U.S. security. First, there was concern about terrorist activity and infiltration from the North. Suspicions rose with the
apprehension of Ahmed Ressam in December 1999, and these were later
bolstered by a 2003 report which suggested that some fifty terrorist
groups were present and active in Canada at that time. 35 Moreover, there
is a considerably wide spread belief that Canadian immigration and border policies are somewhat lax, especially those concerning refugees and
asylum. 36 From the Canadian standpoint, although the 9/11 attacks in the
U.S. increased the salience of counter-terrorism as a policy imperative
(from the standpoint of self-interest), expressed interests continued to focus on building a more open border. Inability to increase security along
the border and allay U.S. concerns would no doubt put this goal in jeopardy. The tremendous back-ups at key points along the border in the
days following 9/11 made this perfectly clear.
With mutual interest in increased cooperation, former Canadian Deputy Prime Minister John Manley and (then) Governor Tom Ridge signed
the Smart Border Declaration on December 12, 2001. The declaration
was accompanied by a 30-point action plan based on four pillars: 1) the
secure flow of people, 2) the secure flow of goods, 3) secure infrastructure, and 4) information sharing and coordination in the enforcement of
these objectives. Table 1 summarizes elements of the 30-point action plan
most relevant to pillars 1, 3, and 4 of the Smart Border Declaration.
33. Stephen Johnson and Sara J. Fitzgerald, "The United States and Mexico: Partners
in Reform," Backgrounder,No. 1715 (Wasington, DC: The Heritage Foundation,
December 2003).
34. Canadian Embassy (Washington, DC), "Governor Ridge and Deputy Prime Minister Manley Issue One-Year Status Report on the Smart Border Action Plan,"
Press Release (Oct. 3, 2003).
35. "North of the Border," CBS News (Sept. 7, 2003), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/
2003/09/0460minutes/printable571584.shtml (accessed February 18, 2004); LaVerle
Berry et al., Nations Hospitable to Organized Crime and Terrorism (Washington,
DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, Oct. 2003).
36. Stephen Gallagher, "Canada's Dysfunctional Refugee Determination System,"
Public Policy Sources 78 (Vancouver, BC: The Fraser Institute, Dec. 2003).
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What becomes quickly evident, even with only a cursory examination of
the language used within the document, is that the Smart Border Declaration advances integration of border management more so in terms of
coordination rather than collaboration. Indeed, according to a 2003 progress report of the Action Plan, there has been considerable progress
made in the area of coordination.
TABLE 1:
DEGREE OF HARMONIZATION WITH SELECTED ELEMENTS
OF THE U.S.-CANADA SMART BORDER ACTION PLAN

Single Alternative
Inspection System
Refugee and Asylum
Processing
Refugee and Asylum

Description
Establish common standards for biometrics
Expedited inspection lanes for frequent travelers
Share information regarding refugee/
asylum applicants
Establishment of "safe third country"

Policy

policy

Visa Policy Coordination

Increase cooperation in visa processing by sharing intelligence information
Expansion of air pre-clearance procedures
Provide passenger name records for
travelers
Cooperate on identifying potentially
high-risk travelers
Allow deployment of immigration
officers between countries
Shared training and increased cooperation among border security and law
enforcement agencies
Establish Integrated National Security
Enforcement Teams on a case-by-case
basis
Implement electronic system for
exchange of fingerprint and criminal
records information

Area
Biometrics

Air Pre-clearance
Advance Passenger
Information
Joint Passenger Analysis Units
Immigration Officers
Overseas
Integrated Border
Enforcement Teams
Integrated Intelligence
Fingerprint information sharing

Coordination or
Collaboration?
Coordination
Coordination
Coordination
Collaboration
Coordination
Coordination
Coordination
Coordination
Coordination
Coordination
Coordination
Coordination

Source: Canadian Embassy (Washington, DC)
In terms of bilateral cooperation and the creation of "smarter" borders,
several examples are particularly noteworthy. The US-Canada NEXUS

program represents a model example in terms of migration control.
NEXUS is intended to concurrently facilitate migration flows while main-
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taining protocols to increase security. The program enlists the cooperation of several agencies on both sides of the border, including the U.S.
Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Canadian
Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA), and Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC). NEXUS is intended to facilitate the flow of "low
risk" travelers who are pre-screened and must be approved by officials in
both Canada and the United States. 37 The number of designated lanes
for NEXUS participants has been continually expanding, beginning with
one site in June 2000 (Port Huron-Sarnia) and expanding to fifteen by the
fall of 2003.38
The expansion of the Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs)
also suggests progress in bilateral cooperation in border control between
the United States and Canada. Initially established in 1996 along the border in the western region of Washington state to combat drug smuggling
and illegal immigration, IBETs have now been expanded across the entire U.S.-Canada border. IBETs establish coordination between numerous agencies, including ICE, the Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection, the FBI, ATF, U.S. Secret Service, the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police (RCMP), the CCRA, and numerous local law enforcement agencies on both sides of the border. These are then managed by a
Joint Management Team of senior officials drawn from participating
agencies that facilitate intelligence sharing and conduct joint operations
for border security. Such cooperation, especially in terms of intelligence,
increases control capacities for both Canadian and American agencies.
Roy Hoffman, head of the ICE office in Blaine, Washington, suggested
that, "Sharing information with our Canadian counterparts allowed both
sides to better determine where our efforts had to be centered and gave
39
all of us a better chance of success."
Such improvements in bilateral coordination have been touted as evidence that security can be established without sacrificing security by creating smarter borders. In the one-year progress report, John Manley
argued that, "The speed with which we have been able to expand programs like NEXUS, FAST and our Integrated Border Enforcement
Teams demonstrates our commitment to making the smart border a reality. '' 40 As shown in Table 1, however, the level of integration in terms of
the smart border remains relatively shallow, with little effort made to formally link or harmonize policy. That said, there is some progress in terms
of collaboration in the areas of visa issuance and refugee/asylum policy.
Informal convergence is evident in the area of visa issuance. The United
States and Canada now share common visa policies with 175 countries,
37. The White House, "United States-Canada Nexus Program," Press Release (Sept.
9, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2O02/09/print/2002
0909-1.html.
38. Canadian Embassy, Press Release.
39. Quoted in Jerry Seper, "Cooperation at the Border Bolsters Law Enforcement,"
The Washington Times (Jan. 5, 2004), A7.
40. Canadian Embassy, Press Release.

444

LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 11

41
though they still differ with respects to 18 other countries.
Refugee and asylum policy also reflects increased collaboration, although there seems to be a considerable difference in attitudes between
Canadian and American policy makers. At issue is whether or not Canada is "soft" on refugee and asylees, and both the ideational and political obstacles to policy change in this area to conform to American desires
for increased security. American policy makers need not rely solely on
their own suspicions. Skepticism has also been raised by critics north of
the border. For example, a Fraser Institute study suggested that, "Canada's refugee-determination system and migration-control policies are
out of step with what appears to be a clear convergence of policies and
practices in the developed world. '4 2 Joe Bissett, former executive director of the Canadian Immigration Service, seconded this opinion: "We
have the 43
most generous refugee system in the world. Much too

generous.

Although harmonization of asylum policy is listed under the 30-point
action plan, a closer look at the issue warrants pessimism as to the
probability of increased collaboration. In terms of current policy, several
dimensions of the Canadian system make it disproportionately open relative to other advanced industrial states. These include high rates of approvals, a generous social welfare system, infrequent prosecutions, and
lax deportation procedures. In 2002, the refugee recognition rate (for incountry determinations) in Canada was nearly double the U.S. rate, while
the per-capita acceptance rate of refugees from 2000-2002 (in-country
44
Convention refugee recognitions) was four times the American rate.
Moreover, authorities- detain few refugees and asylees while their claims
are pending adjudication, even though Canadian law permits detention of
those applicants who might represent a possible security threat or flight
risk.4 5 In fact, generally only 5 percent of refugees entering Canada are
detained, while the remaining 95 percent are released until their immigration hearing is held.4 6 Moreover, in Canada there are few barriers to
claimants working and accessing social entitlement programs while their
claims are pending. In contrast, in the United States the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA) added
to existing restrictions on access to social welfare for applicants while
41.

Migration News (July 2005), http://migration.ucdavis.edu (accessed Oct. 5, 2005).

42. Gallagher, p. 5.
43. Quoted in "North of the Border," CBS News.
44. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR Population Statistics
(Geneva: UNHCR, Aug. 4, 2003), table 5, reprinted in Gallagher, pp. 18-19.
45. Peter Rekai points to several causes for this failure to detain potential "high risk"
applicants. These include lack of proper intelligence necessary for to identify
"high risk" applicants, lack of adequate detention facilities, and humanitarian considerations. See Peter Rekai, "U.S. and Canadia Immigration Policies: Marching
Together to Different Tunes," CD. Howe Institute Commentary 171 (Nov. 2002),
p. 13.

46. "North of the Border," CBS News; James Bissett, "Canada's Asylum System: A
Threat to American Security?," Backgrounder (Washington, DC: Center for Immigration Studies, May 2002).
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their cases are being adjudicated by requiring that employment authorization not be authorized for a period of at least six months. Because
"first instance" determination of asylum status must be processed within
180 days according to U.S. law, employment opportunities are reserved
47
only for those who warrant an affirmative determination of their case.
Moreover, in addition to detaining claimants pending review of their
case, the United States also has an "expedited removal" system in place
that facilitates detention and removal of individuals apprehended who do
not have proper immigration or travel documents. In addition, out-ofstatus foreigners in the country for more than one year are barred from
48
applying for asylum and are subject to deportation if apprehended.
In contrast to its American usage, the use of the term "expedited" in
the Canadian sense has been to "speed positive claims toward recognition."' 49 Failure to detain applicants pending what is often a lengthy judicial review process is coupled with a de facto policy of failing to deport
those who either fail to appear at their hearing or are denied refugee
status. One analyst noted, "Not only does Canada permit anyone who
arrives to make an asylum claim, but many of those eventually denied
refugee status are never removed from the country. Only about 9,000
people are removed from Canada each year, and of these, approximately
two-third[s] are failed asylum seekers."'50 According to the Auditor-General's 2003 report, Canadian authorities have lost track of 36,000 foreign51
ers that were supposed to be deported over the past six years.
Canada's refugee and asylum policies have resulted in trends that are
disconcerting to some security-minded American policy makers. Certainly, Canada's stance vis-A-vis asylum and refugees make it a first choice
for those seeking protection, as well as those seeking admission who
failed through other channels. 52 Unfortunately, this also creates conditions conducive for the infiltration of foreign terrorists. The Canadian
Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) has confirmed the presence of some
fifty active terrorist organizations operating in Canada, ranging in scope
53
from the Irish Republican Army to Hezbollah, Hamas, and al Qaeda.
Moreover, Hani Al-Sayegh, Gazi Ibrahim Abu Mezer, Nabil Al-Murabh,
and Ahmed Ressam (all known terrorists) gained access to Canada by
seeking political asylum upon entry. 54 Canadian officials were recently
outraged when a report issued by the Federal Research Division of the
47. Gallagher, p. 11.
48. Migration News (Apr. 2003).
49. Gallagher, p. 14.

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Bissett, p. 5.
Berry et al., p. 147.
Gallagher, p. 9.
"North of the Border," CBS News.
Al-Sayegh was suspected in the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudia Arabia;
Abu Mezer was apprehended with plans to detonate a bomb on a New York City
subway in 1997; AI-Murabh has been identified as a key operative of Osama bin
Laden; and Ressam was arrested trying to enter the United States from Canada
with 100 pounds of high explosives intended for detonation at Los Angeles International Airport on New Years Eve, 1999. "North of the Border," CBSNews.com.
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Library of Congress listed Canada among the nations that are "hospitable
to organized crime and terrorism. '55 The authors quoted a senior CSIS
official who argued that, "in most cases, [terrorists] appear to use Canadian residence as a safe haven, a means to raise funds, to plan or support
overseas activities or as a way to obtain Canadian travel documents which
make global travel easier." 56 From a U.S. security point of view, this represents a potential threat to American security as terrorists can exploit
Canadian policy and then use their Canadian base as a potential staging
ground for terrorist attacks.
In the European Union, policy makers have sought to increase security
through integration and policy harmonization, including "fast track"
processing to dismiss "patently unfounded" asylum claims and applying
"safe third country" and "safe country of origin" principles in asylum
processing to reduce the practice of "asylum shopping." Indeed, in the
case of Germany, EU harmonization provided a rationale for a significant
tightening of asylum policy, one that had been the most liberal in postWWII Europe and protected by the German Basic Law. 57 Applying this
strategy in North America has proven to be politically challenging, even
given the strong bilateral relationship between Canada and the United
States.
Canadian concerns for protecting the human rights of bona fide refugees and asylum seekers fleeing persecution made them weary to apply
strict limitations on "safe third country" entrants. For example, a Canadian Refugee Bill that included a "safe third country" provision was tabled in Parliament in 1987. After heated debate and considerable
political opposition, the bill finally was approved in July 1988. However,
when the new law came into effect, government officials were unable to
establish a list of "safe countries." Moreover, the Cabinet did not consider the United States to be a "safe country" for Salvadorans and
Guatemalans that fled Central America in the 1980s. Ultimately, the
Minister of Immigration announced that, "at the present time I am prepared to proceed with no country on the safe third country list."'58 New
legislation passed after 9/11 has yet to change Canada's concerns about
the practice of safe third country principles in asylum processing. The
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, passed in November 2001, actually increases restrictions on applying the "safe third country" principle
in the practical processing of asylum claims. A report released in December 2003 points out that, "Article 102(2)(a) of the IRPA requires the government to 'consider' whether a 'responsibility-sharing' agreement exists
55. Berry et al.
56. Ibid, p. 146; Originally cited in Jonathan Dube, "Safe Haven for Terror?"
ABCNews.com (Jan. 13, 2000), http://abcnews.go.com/sections/world/DailyNews/
canadaterrorism000114.html.
57. Christian Joppke, "Asylum and State Sovereignty: A Comparison of the United
States, Germany, and Britain," ComparativePoliticalStudies 30:3 (June 1997), pp.
259-298; Christian Joppke, Immigration and the Nation-State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
58. Quoted in Bissett, p. 4.
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between Canada and the transit country. before a refugee claim can be
considered 'ineligible' for determination in Canada. ' 59 In contrast to
American legislation passed after 9/11 that stresses security interests (e.g.,
USA Patriot Act, the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry/Exit Reform Act), the title of the 2001 legislation touts Canada's commitment to
refugee protection with no reference to security. Moreover, policy makers have made their discomfort at policy harmonization quite clear. In
October 2001, Immigration Minister Elinor Caplan suggested that U.S.Canada discussions concerning a security perimeter focus on information
sharing rather than harmonization: "Let there not be any misunderstanding. Canadian laws will be made right here in the Canadian
Parliament.'"60
On the American side, there appears to be less incentive for a bilateral
third country agreement with Canada, since the flow of asylum seekers
generally flows toward Canada from the United States. Rather, a U.S.
State Department official suggested that the "safe third country" agreement is something that ". . . Canada wants and that we are willing to
'6 1
agree to as a trade-off for other important counterterrorism measures.
Reluctance for deeper integration and harmonization in this area is also
evidenced in practice. For example, U.S. treatment of the case of Maher
Arar suggests wariness with Canada's commitment to the war on terrorism and may also hint at a reluctance to turn over individuals that appear
on U.S. anti-terrorist watch lists. U.S. immigration officials-at Kennedy
Airport detained Arar, a naturalized Canadian citizen born in Syria, on
September 26, 2002, when he was suspected of having ties to Al Qaeda.
Rather than deporting him to Canada, American authorities unilaterally
62
decided to send Arar to Syria, without consulting Canadian authorities.
A recent report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies suggests that, "By refusing to send [Arar] to Canada, the U.S. government
appears to have believed Canada would let Arar walk free, or at a mini63
mum fail to gain any information from him."
The political inertia involved may explain the lag in implementing the
safe third country agreement. The agreement was signed on December 5,
2002, but was not implemented until December 29, 2004. Under the
terms of the agreement, refugee claimants are required" to submit their
claim in the first country they enter-either the United States or Ca59. Gallagher, p. 15.
60. Howard Adelman, "Governance, Globalization and Security: The Harmonization
of Immigration Policy," paper presented at a conference on "Globalization, Multilevel Governance, and Democracy: Continental, Comparative and Global Perspectives," Queens University, Kingston (May 3-4, 2002).
61. United States House of Representatives, Hearing on the U.S. and Canada Safe
Third Country Pact, Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Immigration (Oct. 6,
2002); also Gallagher, p. 15.
62. Canadian Foreign Minister Bill Graham was notified three days after Arar's arrest
that he had been deported to Syria.
63. Andre Belelieu, "Canada Alert: The Smart Border Process at Two: Losing Momentum?," Hemisphere Focus 11:31 (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and
International Studies, Dec. 10, 2003), p. 7.
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nada. 64 In addition to being limited in scope (including only Canada and
the United States), other limitations were included. An exception exists
for refugee claimants attempting to enter Canada from the United States
if they have family in Canada or if they are an unaccompanied minor. In
addition, the agreement applies only to land border crossings. It does not
include claims processed at airports or in the country's interior.
The safe third country agreement is a significant development in border management, and definitely suggests that increased collaboration between the United States and Canada is possible. However, there are
many obstacles facing the creation of a more expansive North American
security perimeter regime. For Canadians, immigration and border policy
preferences are based on 1) maximizing the economic gains from migration, 2) upholding Canada's liberal humanitarian tradition, including protection for refugees and for those fleeing persecution requiring asylum, 3)
facilitating the social integration of new immigrants, and 4) border control as a component of homeland security. 65 Liberal, open policies have
strong domestic lobbies in Canada that have been instrumental in shaping
both immigration and asylum policies. Moreover, consistent with the liberal state hypothesis forwarded by James Hollifield and other migration
scholars, 66 the human rights and immigration law lobbies have successfully institutionalized protections for migrants within the judiciary (as
well as the Immigration and Refugee Board) that constrain policy makers
from enacting restrictionist policies. A Fraser Institute report argues,
"... any effort to harmonize policies with other developed countries to
address the challenge of illegal immigration.., will evoke strong criticism
from refugee advocacy and human rights groups as it has in all other developed countries. '67 Indeed, defense of Canadian liberal identity is also
evidenced in their preference for the term "zone of confidence" rather
than "security perimeter" when discussing bilateral cooperation. 68 Moreover, protection of Canada's approach to immigration reflects its distinctiveness and sovereignty. John Manley made this expression of a defense
of Canadian sovereignty explicit: "Working closely with the United States
does not mean turning over to them the keys to Canadian sovereignty. '69
64. Citizenship* and Immigration Canada, "Fact Sheet: Safe Third Country Agreement," (Dec. 29, 2004).
65. Paul Henry, Trade Policy Analyst, Ecnomic Policy and Programs Division, Selection Branch, Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) put this priorities schema
forward.
66.

Cf James F. Hollifield, Immigrants, Markets and States (Cambridge, MA: Harvard

University Press, 1986); David Jacobson, Rights Across Borders: Immigration and
the Decline of Citizenship(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996);
Yasemin Soysal, The Limits of Citizenship (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1994).
67. Gallagher, p. 31.
68. Peter Andreas, "A Tale of Two Borders: The U.S.-Mexico and U.S.-Canada Lines
After 9-11," Working Paper No. 77 (La Jolla, CA: Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, UCSD, May 2003), p. 12.
69. Quoted in Paul Wells, "We Don't Pull Our Own Weight: Manley," National Post
(Oct. 5, 2001), p. A6; also cited in Donald Barry, "Managing Canada-U.S. Relations in the Post-9/11 Era: Do We Need a Big Idea?," Policy Paperon the Americas
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The Americans also have an economic-based interest in relatively liberal border policies. On this point, there is commonality between American and Canadian interests. However, the emphasis the Bush
administration has placed on security and the war on terrorism warrant
that economic interests cannot be forwarded at the expense of security.
It is here that interests diverge. The Americans see coordination as a
necessary means to increase security. From the U.S. standpoint, maximizing the capacity to screen entrants is not only a homeland security
imperative, but a prerequisite for maintaining a relatively open stance
regarding migration-both permanent and temporary. Coordination and
collaboration would seem to forward this aim. However, like their Canadian counterparts, U.S. policy makers are also keenly defensive of their
sovereignty in the issue of migration, making policy integration politically
difficult. Echoing the sentiments of Canadian policy makers, President
Bush remarked, "You pass your laws, we'll pass our laws."' 70 Christopher
Sands of the Center for Strategic and International Studies argues, "It is
not at all clear that the United States has abandoned its preference for
managing the border unilaterally since September 11. Indeed, in the absence of any clear Canadian initiatives or counterproposals for improving
border security and fighting terrorism in North America, the bilateral cooperation since September 11 is impossible to distinguish from a combination of U.S. unilateralism and Canadian acquiescence to the U.S.
agenda."71
Clearly, when we differentiate between coordination and collaboration,
bilateral cooperation between Canada and the United States is centered
primarily on the former rather than the latter. The Smart Border plan
articulates several areas to cultivate increased coordination but few regarding policy harmonization or integration-in other words, few constraints are placed on independent policy decision making. Howard
Adelman notes that, "Immigration and refugee policy has not been harmonized between Canada and the United States. Nor are there any indications that they will be."' 72 The fact that the driving force behind such a
regime is one that is more in line with a common aversion (terrorist alien
infiltration) than a common interest (preference for a single common outcome), and is influenced by ideas regarding the goals and structures of
such a regime, all would suggest that deeper integration remains unlikely
Vol. XIV, Study 11 (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Nov. 2003), p. 11.
70. Quoted in Steven Frank and Stephen Handelman, "Drawing a Line," Time (Canadian edition) (Oct. 8, 2001), p. 45; also cited in Barry, p. 11.
71. Christopher Sands, "Terrorism, Border Reform, and Canada-United States Relations: Learning the Lessons of Section 110," paper presented at the conference
"Linkages Across the Border: The Great Lakes Economy," held at the Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago, Detroit Branch (Apr. 4, 2002), p. 12.
72. Howard Adelman, "Governance, Globalization and Security: The Harmonization
of Immigration Policy," paper presented at a conference on "Globalization, Multilevel Governance, and Democracy: Continental, Comparative and Global Perspectives," Queens University, Kingston (May 3-4, 2002), p. 24.
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in the foreseeable future. Yet, we might also note that, given the fact that
immigration and border control has long been considered a purely domestic interest, recent developments can be considered a significant step
in the direction of deeper collaboration. As practices involving coordination foster the development of new norms, it is possible that concerns
about sovereignty and ideas regarding appropriate policy may become
less of a barrier to regime formation, at least on a bilateral basis between
Canada and the United States.
B.

THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER PARTNERSHIP AcTION PLAN

The border between the United States and Mexico is an active one.
Levels of trade have continued to grow since the creation of NAFTA, and
Mexico is now the second largest trading partner with the United States.
Migration flows, both official and undocumented, have grown as well.
The San Ysidro port-of-entry remains one of the world's busiest landborder crossing points in the world, including both transborder workers
and tourists. Evidence suggests that illegal immigration flows have increased as well. Border Patrol statistics show that the number of illegal
immigrants apprehended along the southwest border increased from
979,101 in 1994 (fiscal year) to 1,159,802 in fiscal year (FY) 2004.73 These
numbers reached a peak of over 1,600,000 in FY 2000 before the economic downturn in 2001-2002 reduced the economic incentives for migrants. The difficulty of managing an extensive land border between two
countries with such disproportionate economies and wages has prompted
some analysts to suggest that a growing gap exists between control poli74
cies and policy effects on migration flows.
The southern border has been a security concern for American policy
makers since the President's Commission on Migratory Labor issued a
warning in 1951 about an emerging "wetback invasion."'75 This perception of threat has continued since then, evidenced by public statements
regarding "regaining control" of our "neglected border" in the 1970s and
1980s, to the "alien invasion" in the 1990s. For the most part, however,
the nature of the perceived security threat was not linked to a military
dimension, but rather to a combination of security's economic and societal dimensions. 76 Concern over securing the southern border has dominated U.S. policy making over the past thirty years, with a
disproportionate amount of resources and manpower allocated to achieve
73. Wayne A. Cornelius, "Controlling 'Unwanted' Immigration: Lessons from the
United States, 1993-2004," Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 31:4 (July

2005).
74. Referred to as the "Gap Hypothesis." See Cornelius, Tsuda, Martin, and Hollifield, Controlling Immigration:A Global Perspective.
75. President's Commission on Migratory Labor, Migratory Labor in American Agriculture (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951).
76. See Christopher Rudolph, "Security and the Political Economy of International
Migration." Most recently, a highly controversial article by Samuel Huntington
again defined the southern border as a societal threat. See Samuel Huntington,
"The Hispanic Challenge," Foreign Policy (Mar./Apr. 2004).
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this goal. 77 The events of 9/11 have only served to strengthen support for

this approach, and have increased demands for more rigid controls of migration flows between the United States and Mexico.
The Mexican perspective of the border-and migration in generalsharply contrasts with the American view. For Mexicans, migration is a
fundamental way of life and is considered a basic human right. This right
of free movement is codified in the Mexican constitution, but public opinion shows attitudes toward open migration that do not stop at the nation's borders. A 2002 Zogby poll found that 57% of Mexican
respondents agreed with the statement, "Mexicans should have the right
to enter the U.S. without U.S. permission. '7 8 In addition to ideational
aspects, material interests also favor open migration policies. For a country that continues a sometimes-rocky road to advanced industrialization,
international migration offers an important safety valve to stem unemployment pressures in the Mexican economy.79 Moreover, the increasing

volume of currency remittances from emigrants working abroad-now
estimated to amount to at least $14 billion annually-offers a significant
inflow of foreign exchange necessary to increase the country's balance of
payments position. For Mexico, it is estimated that remittances
represent
80
the third-largest source of hard currency for the economy.
It is little wonder then, that Vicente Fox has consistently placed the
issue of international migration at the top of high foreign policy priorities.
Indeed, the Mexican government views the issue of migration at least as
important as the issue of trade, and considers both integral facets of any
North American integration regime. 81 Among the leaders of North
American countries, Fox has been the most forceful in pushing for a
deepening of regional integration following the European model. 82 His
vision for a deepening of NAFTA integration is based on facilitating the
free flow of people, in addition to goods and capital.
Initially, the election of George W. Bush seemed to bode well for a
new round of negotiations regarding immigration. During the election,
Bush sought to build his foreign policy base on the positive relationship
he had established with Fox when he was governor of Texas. Politically,
the divisive anti-immigration rhetoric that proved volatile in the United
77.

Cf Peter Andreas, Border Games: Policing the U.S-Mexico Divide (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 2000); Christopher Rudolph, NationalSecurity and International Migration. Typescript. UCLA (2004).

78. Cited in Jon Dougherty, "Mexicans: Southwest is Ours," WorldNetDaily.Com
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Kevin O'Rourke and Jeffrey Williamson, Globalization and History: The Evolution of a Nineteenth Century Atlantic Economy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
Alonso Urrutia. "Remesas de migrantes equivalen a 83% de la inversion de EU en
Mexico," La Jornada (Oct. 30, 2000), p. Al.
Marc R. Rosenblum, "Moving Beyond the Policy of No Policy: Emigration from
Mexico and Central America," Latin American Politics and Society 46:4 (2004),
forthcoming, p. 10.
Interview with Vicente Fox, The News Hour with Jim Lehrer (Mar. 21, 2000), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bbllatinAmericaljan-juneOO/fox_3-21.html.
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States during the 1990s was quelled by a combination of the economic
boom and the highly visible border defenses that had been established at
key points along the border. 83 After a February 2001 meeting between
Fox and Bush, the U.S.-Mexico High Level Working Group on Migration
was established and a subsequent meeting between the leaders was held
84
on September 5, 2001 to further this agenda.
The political effects of September 11 clearly affected the momentum of
the migration talks and U.S.-Mexican relations more generally. As noted
by Peter Andreas, "Fox's border-free vision of North America was one of
the first casualties of the devastating terrorist attacks .... "85 Bilateral
talks regarding migration were immediately and indefinitely tabled as the
United States focused on the issue of homeland security and the emerging war on terrorism. Fox soon complained that the United States had
become too focused on the issue of security and that the U.S.-Mexican
relationship was suffering because of it.86 Jorge Castafieda, the Mexican
Foreign Minister, suggested that, "In many ways, the region, at least in
terms of U.S. attention, has become once again an Atlantis, a lost
87
continent.
From the American perspective, the newly acknowledged link between
migration control and terrorism cast the southern border in a new light.
What had been largely a political problem prior to 9/11 had now become
a key issue for strategic security. A Library of Congress report suggested
that, "Because of its close proximity to the United States, its porous borders, its strategically significant oil industry, and a large U.S. commercial
and tourism presence, Mexico may serve as a transit or target environment for a foreign terrorist operation." 8 8 The issue of porous borders is
particularly sensitive to U.S. security interests. Traditionally, Mexico has
served as a transit point for economic migrants coming from Central and
South American countries. This, however, poses a risk that terrorists and
their organizations may exploit the same openness. Describing the border situation, Mexican Congressman Emilio Zebadua said, "The Mexican
government is either unable or unwilling to really take this southern border as a major priority." He added, "They have pretty much left it as an
open border." 89
Prior to September 11, the United States government pressured the
Fox Administration to address the security by suggesting that increased
83.

Christopher Rudolph, "Security

and the Political Economy of International

Migration."
84. The White House, "Joint Statement Between the United States of America and
the United Mexican States," Press Release (Sept. 6, 2001), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010906-8.html.

85. Andreas, "A Tale of Two Borders."
86. Migration News (Oct. 2002).
87. Jorge Castafieda, "The Forgotten Relationship," Foreign Affairs (May/June 2003),

p. 70.
88. Berry et al., p. 171.
89. Quoted in Hugh Dellios, "Mexico Struggles to Secure Its Southern Border,"
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security is a necessary condition for talks concerning a bilateral migration
accord. The result was the Plan Sur (South Plan) that was aimed at apprehending and repatriating illegal aliens crossing Mexico's southern border. The events of 9/11 increased U.S. support for the program and
prompted material support. The U.S. government supplied boats to the
Mexican navy to patrol the southern shore, and also provided needed
capital to pay for the repatriation program. In 2002, the program repatriated 120,000 immigrants to their home countries, and another 141,000
were returned in 2003. 90 Though such measures have increased security
on the border somewhat, it is far from "secure." A representative of the
UNHCR suggested that control remained elusive: "Controlling this border is impossible. And it's not only a question of will. It's a question of
geography, corruption, violence and the well organized nature of the
trafficking." 91
The issue of government corruption not only plagues security along the
southern border, but also in terms of access into Mexico and the United
States more generally. Moreover, events immediately following 9/11 suggested that this could contribute to infiltration by terrorists, who would
then attempt to cross the border into the United States. In October 2001,
an Iraqi-born migrant smuggler confessed to establishing a working relationship with a corrupt Mexican immigration officer in order to smuggle
over 1,000 migrants from the Middle East into the United States. A Heritage Foundation report argues, "Despite direct intervention by President
Fox to end bribery on the U.S.-Mexican border, customs and immigration
'92
services are weak elsewhere and plagued by corruption.
Mexico has long been sensitive to U.S. policy makers referring to illegal immigration as a security threat. Ironically, though, security has
paved the way for a renewal of talks on a bilateral accord dealing with
migration. Although from a normative standpoint framing migration in a
security context is anathema to Mexican sensibilities, it provides a "more
politically palatable rationale for Mexico to cooperate on immigration
control. '9 3 The key issue is where the "security" focus is placed. For
Mexicans, immigration control is not problematic so long as it is not directed primarily at them, but rather other foreign nationals who may use
the country as a transit point to gain entry into the United States. Moreover, using a security rationale has also given Mexican diplomats another
tool to use to garner U.S. support for two of its primary foreign policy
goals: 1) amnesty for the current population of undocumented workers
living in the United States, and 2) a legal alternative to undocumented
access to the American economy. Mexican policy makers are careful in
90. Hugh Dellios, "Mexico Struggles to Secure Its Southern Border," AberdeenNews.com (March 4, 2004), available at http://www.aberdeennews.com (accessed
Mar. 5, 2004).
91. Ariel Riva, local director for the UNHCR, quoted in Dellios, "Mexico Struggles to
Secure Its Southern Border."
92. Johnson and Fitzgerald, "The United States and Mexico: Partners in Reform."
93. Andreas, "A Tale of Two Borders," p. 10.
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TABLE 2:
DEGREE OF HARMONIZATION WITH SELECTED ELEMENTS
OF THE U.S.-MEXICO SMART BORDER ACTION PLAN
Area
Pre-Cleared Travelers
Advanced Passenger
Information
Facilitate Travel
Within NAFTA
Countries
Safe Borders
Visa Policy

Joint Training
Compatible Databases
Screening ThirdCountry Nationals

Description
Expand the use of SENTRI lanes at
high-volume ports of entry
Establish a joint APIS system for USMexico flights
Explore methods to facilitate the
movement of NAFTA travelers
Increase safety along the border for
migrants; reduce migrant smuggling
Continue consultations on visa policies and visa screening procedures.
Share intelligence information.
Conduct joint training in the areas of
investigation and document analysis
Develop systems for exchanging and
sharing intelligence
Enhance cooperative efforts to detect,
screen, and deal with potentially dan-

Coordination or
Collaboration?
Coordination
Coordination
Coordination

Coordination
Coordination

Coordination
Coordination
Coordination

gerous third-country nationals

Source: The White House
how they define the security interests involved. Interior Minister Santiago Creel remarked, "The Mexican migratory flow represents no risk
whatsoever, even less if it is documented. ' 94 Careful to emphasize that
Mexican migrants do not represent a potential terrorist threat, Creel argued that, "Migrant regularization would provide the United States with
'95
a greater margin of security than the one it currently has."
American desires to leverage its homeland security program by garnering assistance from its neighbors, combined with the emerging desire of
Mexican officials to leverage cooperation in return for renewed talks concerning migration, led to the U.S.-Mexico Smart Border Agreement, announced in March 2002. The agreement put forward a 22-point action
plan that outlined the specific areas for increased coordination and harmonization in three categories, including the secure flow of people,
goods, and infrastructure. 96 Table 2 lists the elements of the 22-point action plan specifically addressed to the issue of bilateral cooperation in the
category of international migration. As is the case with the Smart Border
94. Quoted in Justin Gest, "Mexican Official Touts Amnesty as a Security Booster for
the U.S.," Los Angeles Times (July 11, 2003), p. A8.
95. Ibid.
96. Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/usmxborder/22points.html.
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agreement between the United States and Canada, the action plan is intended to identify areas where increased cooperation can be mutually
beneficial and establishes a framework for future development.
When examining the U.S.-Mexico agreement and action plan in detail,
two features are readily apparent. First, as is the case with the U.S.-Canada agreement, the emphasis is exclusively on increasing coordination
rather than collaboration or harmonization. Second, the verbiage on
many of the items in the action plan is vague, especially when compared
to the verbiage used in the U.S.-Canada plan. 97 Where the word "harmonization" is used, it refers to the standardization of infrastructure, such as
98
compatible databases, or to synchronizing operations at ports of entry.
It makes no attempt to suggest that migration policies would be harmonized. Where policy issues are identified, such as visa policy, "harmonization" is intended to refer to establishing "enhanced cooperation" in
screening third country nationals by facilitating information sharing.
Along many of the areas specified in the agreement, particularly those
dealing with migration, participants are bound only to "explore methods"
or "continue consultations"-suggesting both an extremely limited degree of integration and a palpable uncertainly about the prospects for
such integration in the future. The agreement clearly emphasizes those
dimensions border issues where there is a high degree of common interest, including facilitating trade flows, facilitating the movement of "low
risk" travelers, and protecting human rights. Former DHS Secretary Tom
Ridge and Interior Minister Santiago Creel pointed to several developments as evidence of "tremendous progress" over the past year. These
include expanding the SENTRI program, expanding the Border Safety
Program (to reduce deaths of migrants trying to cross the border), and
expanding FAST lanes at ports of entry.99
Security issues receive much less emphasis and/or specificity. The limited gains achieved through the U.S.-Mexican accord were evident in recent statements by Ridge and Creel. In February 2004, Ridge and Creel
touted two developments as evidence of progress in bilateral cooperation:
1) a tentative agreement that affirms U.S. policy to deport illegal immigrants to their home regions, not just across the border, and 2) the establishment of a secure telephone line between Ridge and Creel. 10 0 There
has also been progress in terms of the Advanced Passenger Information
97. Deborah Waller Meyers, "Does 'Smarter' Lead to Safer? An Assessment of the
Border Accords with Canada and Mexico," Insight (Washington, DC: Migration
Policy Institute, June 2003), p. 9.
98. In terms of synchronizing operations, the action plan specifies "harmonizing"
hours of operation, infrastructure improvements, and traffic flow management at
adjoining port of entry on both sides of the border.
99. U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, "Prepared Remarks by Secretary Ridge at Press
Availability with Secretary Creel on the Border Betweeen the United States and
Mexico," Press Release (Apr. 24, 2003), available at http://www.usembassy-mexico.gov/releases/ep030424remarks ridge.htm.
100. Ricardo Alsonso-Zaldivar, "War on Terrorism Draws U.S. and Mexico Closer,"
Los Angeles Times (Feb. 29, 2004), p. A14.
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System, as well as expressed desires to implement the NEXUS program
as has been done between the United States and Canada.
In terms of security, the most significant development in terms of the
possibility for an integrated U.S.-Mexican approach for migration control
is the change in the tenor of the discussions. By reframing their arguments in terms that emphasize security benefits gained through "safe, orderly, and secure" migration, Mexican policy makers have helped to
restart discussions that were essentially dead in the water after 9/11. Santiago Creel points out that, "Without a doubt, security is an area that has
allowed us to draw closer." 10 1 Mexican authorities hope that giving security a favorable ear will provide the necessary political leverage to pressure U.S. lawmakers to pass an amnesty bill through Congress and
establish a new guest worker program for Mexican laborers. However, it
is not likely that we will see this new dialogue or the Smart Border
Agreement produce a comprehensive, integrated approach to migration
control in the near future, even on a limited bilateral basis. U.S. policy
makers face considerable obstacles to fulfilling Mexican desires for such a
comprehensive plan, especially the issue of amnesty-a politically unpopular policy for a vast majority of the American public. Instead, the
Americans have shown a preference for a much more limited type of cooperation. Roger Noriega, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Western hemispheric affairs, clarified the U.S. position: "I think (small steps)
will allow us to continue to consult with and gauge the interest from our
Congress. But decisions on [a comprehensive U.S.-Mexican migration
accord] have to come from the very top, and at this point we're not in
position to go forward on the bigger agenda, the broader, more comprehensive approach. '10 2 Colin Powell, who suggested that a migration accord is "going to take us a lot more time and a lot more effort," echoed
complex
this sentiment. He added that immigration involves "extremely
10°3
and difficult issues" that involve a lot of "political interests.
IV. THE ROAD AHEAD
Policy makers in each of the NAF-FA member states have expressed a
desire for some form of multilateral action concerning migration control.
Americans have put forward the notion of a "security perimeter,"
Canadians have referred to the establishment of a "zone of confidence,"
and the Mexicans have suggested that only a comprehensive approach is
acceptable-"It's the whole enchilada or nothing. ' 10 4 The empirical evidence presented here suggests, however, that the unequal distribution of
101. Quoted in Alsonso-Zaldivar, p. A14.
102. Quoted in Alfredo Corchado, "Possibility of Migration Accord with Mexico Revisited," The Dallas Morning News (Nov. 12, 2003).
103. Quoted in Eric Green, "Powell Says U.S. Wants Movement on Immigration Issues
with Mexico," Usinfo.State.gov (June 2, 2003), available at http://www.usinfo.state.
gov/gi/Archive/2003/Jun/04-808468.html.
104. Jorge Castafieda, quoted in Tom Zoellner, "Mexico Says Legalize Crossers or No
Deal," The Arizona Republic (June 22, 2001).
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power among NAFTA states, disparate interests, and ideational factors
make the establishment of a comprehensive, harmonized regime governing migration and border policy in North America highly unlikely. Peter Andreas notes, "To 'Schengenize' North America's borders. . . would
require a level of formal institutionalization and policy harmonization
that is difficult to imagine in the present context ....-1o5
Reflecting disparate interests, policy makers in each state have a different notion of what a "North American security perimeter" would consist
of. The Americans stress increasing security through screening, while the
Mexicans have always favored an EU-style "open borders" regime. The
Canadians fall somewhere in-between. Each has an interest in increasing
protection against terrorism, but for markedly different reasons. Clearly,
given its power and the leadership role it has assumed in the global "war
on terrorism," Americans are most acutely threatened by the proliferation of international terrorism and have placed the most emphasis on security regarding migration and border policy. The Canadian and Mexican
governments appear more concerned that terrorists may use their countries in transit to direct terrorism against the United States and that such
terrorist acts would deteriorate bilateral relations. This, in turn, would
complicate their desire for more open borders. However, neither Canada
nor Mexico seems ready (or able, in the Mexican case) to acquiesce to
U.S. security interests, nor are their interests necessarily convergent.
Moreover, each remains committed to sovereignty over policy decisions,
as are American policy makers.
Power, interest, and ideational variables identified by regime theorists
all suggest that a formal comprehensive North American migration regime is unlikely. This is certainly supported by the available empirical
evidence of current developments of expressed interests. NAFTA has always forwarded a process of shallow rather than deep integration, as is
the case with the European Union, and has been focused primarily on the
issue of trade liberalization. With the exception of the Fox administration
in Mexico, there has been little support for deepening North American
integration. Rather, political support has been directed toward expanding the scope of existing integration to include countries in Central
and South America-the creation of a Free Trade Area of the Americas.
Although the post-9/11 security dilemma may have increased interests for
greater integration that includes migration control, there is little to suggest that this "dilemma of common aversion" will result in a comprehensive, formal regime. Instead, the "security perimeter"-at least regarding
migration-will likely consist of myriad points of bilateral rather than
multilateral coordination, and will also maintain state sovereignty with
regards to migration policy.
Given these political realities, what are the available options? Where
do we go from here? At this point it is not at all clear that we actually
105. Andreas, "A Tale of Two Borders," p. 12.
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need a comprehensive, formal, and multilateral regime. Indeed, following Arthur Stein's model, the expression of interests among North American policy makers suggest that the issue of border management is one of
a dilemma of common aversion rather than common interest-at least in
this early post-9/11 period. Because unity of interest is centered on
avoiding a particular outcome, we are most likely to see a continuation of
the somewhat fragmented approach taken to date. A U.S. State Department official recently suggested that, "a piece-by-piece approach represents the best strategy for achieving a migration pact that's vital to both
the United States' security and its economy. ' 10 6 Instead of a multilateral
security perimeter regime, the short-term focus needs to be placed on
establishing a working security system and increasing ad-hoc coordination among NAFTA countries.
Increased openness is in the economic interests of each NAFTA member country, yet American policy makers have made it clear that such
openness cannot be achieved at the expense of homeland security. Because homeland security issues are now a necessary condition to forward
liberalization, policy makers must focus on those elements most crucial to
any security regime. These elements include gathering and organizing intelligence, creating effective infrastructure to disseminate this information, and ensuring that access to this system is secure and controlled. At
this point, American efforts in this regard remain very much a work in
progress. The creation of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (now
the National Counterterrorism Center or NCTC) represents a tremendous first step in building a better intelligence base, and the new Terrorist
Screening Center offers potential for expedited access to this information
that is crucial if security is to be increased without creating back-logs at
consulates abroad and ports-of-entry. It is important to include Canadian
and Mexican officials in terror assessment and to promote the establishment of similar security infrastructure in those countries so that intelligence information can be effectively shared among them. Key issues that
need to be addressed include: 1) what information will be made available
to foreign security officials, 2) what process will be used to vet foreign
officials for access to the American intelligence system, and 3) how can
security be maintained in terms of access to the system? Multilateral consultations must also address the logistical demands that such international
cooperation may make on the computer systems that process such information. If the United States makes TSC information available to Canadian and Mexican immigration officials, what effect would this have on
the computer hardware system? Are current facilities adequate to process information requests?
Including Canadian and Mexican officials in threat assessment and providing access to anti-terrorist intelligence also provides an incentive for
106.

Roger Noriega, Assitant Secretary of State for Western Hemispheric Affairs, paraphrased by Alfredo Corchado, "Possibility of Migration Accord with Mexico Revisited," The Dallas Morning News (Nov. 12, 2003).
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their governments to increase screening procedures for those entering
their countries. Increasing the probability that potential terrorists can be
effectively identified prior to entry or detained if they have already entered the country is in everyone's best interests. What will be imperative
then, is making sure that access to this information is facilitated. Clearly,
much work needs to be done regarding the role of information technology in providing access to intelligence information and facilitating screening processes. Promoting "harmonization" among NAFTA countries
regarding information infrastructure and controlled access to this system
will likely form the basis of movement toward a North American security
perimeter in the short run. Once these necessary security conditions are
in place, talks on regime formation can once again focus on the common
interest: facilitating cross-border movement in North America to promote economic gains.
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